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that the majority in Katchen v. Landy stressed the congressional in-
tent of the act and only briefly mentioned the "equity argument."33
Perhaps the Court is of the opinion that this policy of expediency is
sufficient in and of itself to imply consent by a creditor to summary
jurisdiction throughout the bankruptcy proceeding.
It was previously pointed out that the distinctions between sum-
mary and plenary suits are largely procedural, and that despite the
denial of a jury trial, the creditor is still afforded due process of
law.34 These arguments apply equally to unrelated counterclaims,
but it must be remembered that section 23 (b) seems to preserve
the creditor's right to a plenary suit unless he consents to a sum-
mary proceeding. It is submitted that there is no small distinction
between compulsory and permissive counterclaims in this area and
that perhaps the courts should re-examine the problem before de-
nying a jury trial where a creditor may be subject to a large unre-
lated counterclaim. However, in view of the recent liberal trend
of case law and commentary, the Supreme Court may already be
prepared to apply Katchen to erase the distinction between compul-
sory and permissive counterclaims in bankruptcy.
CHARLES P. RosE, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENSES - MENTAL
IMPAIRMENT
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
Mental impairment as a defense to criminal prosecutions exists
under varied forms in American law. According to the widely fol-
lowed rule in M'Naghten's Case,' the accused is not criminally re-
sponsible if, at the time of the wrongful act, he did not know the
nature and quality of that act, or if knowing it, he did not realize
that his act was wrong.' Some jurisdictions have supplemented this
rule with the "irresistible impulse" test3 which dictates a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity if the accused, though aware that his
act was wrong, was nevertheless incapable of controlling his con-
tion between compulsory and permissive counterclaims in this area. Interstate Nat'1
Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 944
(1956); In re Nathan, 98 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
33 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1966).
34 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
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duct at the time.4 The 1954 case of Durham v. United States'
enunciated still another rule which relieves the accused from crimi-
nal responsibility if "his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect."'
The Second Circuit, in the recent case of Freeman v. United
States,7 has become the first federal court to adopt verbatim both
elements of the new test of mental impairment which has been pro-
posed by the American Law Institute:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciite the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
(2) As used in this article, the terms "mental disease or de-
fect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.8
This test, like its predecessors, has also been thoroughly criticized;
but the acclaim from the highly respected Second Circuit in Freeman
should give added impetus to the growing acceptance of the test.9
In the Freeman case, the defendant Charles Freeman was in-
dicted for the illegal possession and sale of narcotics. Expert testi-
mony indicated that he was laboring under both physical and mental
impairment, largely as a result of narcotics addiction and alcoholism.
He was diagnosed as a sociopathic personality with schizoid traits,1"
1 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
2 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
3 E.g., Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940
(1957). The test is "nowhere relied on as sole criterion of criminal responsibility."
LINDMAN & McINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 332 (1961).
4 Sauer v. United States, supra note 3, at 643.
5 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
6 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). It is now held
in the District of Columbia that "a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and
substantially impairs behavior controls." McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1962). (Emphasis added.)
7357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
91Te Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1961), predicated responsibility upon the accused's "substantial capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." Id. at 775. However, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the entire section 4.01 (1) of the Model Penal Code
in Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
946 (1964), and expressly rejected Currens for its failure to recognize the cognitive
aspect of the test. Id. at 427.
10 The sociopath is ill primarily in terms of society, rather than in terms of physi-
cal discomfort. Sociopathic reactions, however, are often indications of severe under-
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and although the defendant was capable of acting purposefully, he
had only limited ability to know that his acts were wrong." At
trial, his defense of lack of responsibility, as measured by the
M'Naghten rule, 2 was not sustained, and he was convicted on both
charges. Judge Kaufman, speaking for the Second Circuit in the
instant case, reversed the convictions and abandoned that circuit's
test of criminal responsibility."3
The Freeman opinion set forth the several tests of mental im-
pairment adopted in various other jurisdictions and outlined the
criticisms traditionally aimed at them. M'Naghten was rejected pri-
marily because of its exclusive reliance on the cognitive elements
of the accused's personality.'4 Such reliance was deemed not only
psychologically unsound but, in Judge Kaufman's view, also socially
undesirable to the extent that continual offenders convicted under
the strict M'Naghten test soon serve their prison sentences and are
set free to endanger again the public welfare. A broader definition
of mental impairment, however, would allow indeterminate civil
commitment of the potential recidivist.'5 The rule has also been
faulted because it recognizes no degree of incapacity"6 and "shackles"
lying personality disorders or organic brain injury or disease. The impairment may
be exhibited in various anti-social reactions, including sexual deviation and addiction.
Mental Disorders, AMmucAN PSYCI-TATEIC A. DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL J. 38-
39 (Special Reprint 1965). A person showing schizoid traits might exhibit qualities
of coldness, emotional detachment, fearfulness, or day dreaming. Id. at 35.
"United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 609-12 (2d Cir. 1966).
12 Irresistible impulse and M'Naghten were the tests of mental impairment in the
Second Circuit during Freeman's trial. However, it was stipulated at trial that irresis-
tible impulse did not apply. United States v. Freeman, supra note 11, at 612 & n.12.
'
5 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 624 (2d Cir. 1966).
1'Ibid. Wechsler, Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 367,
373 (1955). Cognition has been defined as "the capacity of one to know and appre-
ciate the nature and quality of his act, and to know that it was wrong." Wion v. United
States, 325 F.2d 420, 427 (1963).
15United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1966). Such a test has
also been criticized because of the burden it places on psychiatric hospitals. Diamond,
From McNaughten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. Rv. 189, 193 (1962);
Insanity as a Defense, in ANNUAL JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE, SECOND JUDICIAL Cm-
CUlT OF THE UNITED STATES, 37 F.R.D. 365, 374 (1964) (panel discussion, remarks
of Judge Weintraub). A noted authority, Professor Jerome Hall, has pointed out that
"from a medical viewpoint, it may be absurd to release an offender at a fixed time that
in fact has no relation to rehabilitation. But if no law fixes an upper limit, there is
no adequate protection for any convicted person against life imprisonment." Hall,
Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 766 (1956).
16United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1966). The test of men-
tal impairment under the M'Naghten rule is categorically stated whereas the Model
Penal Code test recognizes intermediate degrees of mental capacity. Under the latter
test, the accused is not responsible for criminal conduct if he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1) (1962).
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expert psychiatric testimony.' The irresistible impulse test was dis-
carded as "inherently inadequate"'" since its language "carries the
misleading implication that a crime impulsively committed must
have been perpetrated in a sudden and explosive fit"' 9  The test,
therefore, excludes those uncontrollable actions which may have re-
sulted from a long period of brooding. The Durham rule, though
lauded by the court, nevertheless was said to raise "near impossible
problems of causation,"2 while failing "to give the fact-finder any
standard by which to measure the competency of the accused."'"
The Model Penal Code test is an attempt to circumvent these
criticisms while preserving some valuable aspects of the old rules.
As in M'Ngghten, section 4.01 (1) of the code recognizes that the
determination of criminal responsibility is "not a medical but a
legal, social [andi moral judgment,"2 and that cognition is an im-
portant consideration in determining responsibility.a Although
remnants of "irresistible impulse" are also evident, the language of
section 4.01(1) dearly avoids the limitations of that earlier test"4
Whereas the irresistible impulse test was particularly concerned with
uncontrollable acts arising from a sudden impulse, the Model Penal
Code considers all the offensive acts of the accused, including those
conceived in longer periods of brooding. Section 4.01 (1) also de-
parts from the old rules by predicating criminal responsibility upon
only a substantial capacity to "appreciate" or "conform."
Section 4.01(2) limits the terms "mental disease or defect" by
excluding abnormalities manifested only by "repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct."2 The drafters of the test apparently
felt this restriction indispensable;2" however, the section has been
1' United States v. Freeman, supra note 16, at 619. However, it has been said that,
in practice, courts have broadly interpreted the M'Naghten rule with the result that
"all psychiatric evidence relevant to the defendant's medical condition is admitted."
Hall, supra note 12, at 774. This type of permissive approach was evident in the re-
cent first-degree murder case of State v. Colby, 6 Ohio Misc. 19 (C.P. 1966), wherein
the defendant was found not guilty "by reason of insanity."
18United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir. 1966).
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at 621.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 619; accord, Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 427 (10th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); Plocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 866 (D.C.
Cir. 1961) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963).
23 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 624 (2d Cir. 1966).
24 Insanity as a Defense, supra note 15, at 393 (remarks of Professor Wechsler).
25 Ibid.
26
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1962).
27Wechler, supra note 14, at 376.
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severely criticized by psychiatrists.2" The language is intended to
hold the sociopath (or psychopath) responsible,29 but use of this
section may hamper the effectiveness of the test in a jurisdiction
where psychiatrists have classified the "sociopathic personality" as a
mental disease and testify to that effect.3" This problem of labels
may be insignificant, however, since psychiatric testimony as to the
accused's condition will almost always indicate additional symptoms
of mental disorder besides recidivism or other anti-social behavior?"
The Model Penal Code test is said to reflect a more progressive
legal attitude toward the defense of mental impairment."2 Never-
theless, some confusion has arisen with respect to the rule's applica-
tion. One prominent authority has asserted that the phrases, "ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of his conduct" and "capacity to ... con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law," in section 4.01 (1)
may be applied as mutually exclusive alternatives."3 If this inter-
pretation is followed, the new test would then be only as effective
as those individual tests which the Model Penal Code was specif-
ically drafted to replace. Judge Kaufman, at one point in his
opinion, appeared to indulge in this interpretation, 4 but a closer
reading of the opinion suggests that he has, in effect, considered
the tests to be cumulative. Therefore, both factors would have
to be evidenced before a person could be adjudged not responsible
for his criminal acts.
A second difficulty relates to the language of the Model Penal
Code formulation. A comparison of the terms used in the various
tests indicates the semantic refinements drafted into the Model
Penal Code; but, as with the prior tests, the terms have not been
precisely defined. Because of this lack of definition, "result of"
is probably no more explicit than "product"; nor is "appreciate"
better than "know."35  Perhaps the greatest significance of the new
2 8 Diamond, supra note 15, at 194 & n. 23; Kozol, The Psychopath Before the Law,
44 MAss. LQ. 106, 116 (1959).
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comments at 157 (1962).
30 The problem appeared in 1957 in the District of Columbia when, over a partic-
ular weekend, the psychiatrists at St. Elizabeth Hospital changed their definition of the
term "mental disease." Plocker v. United States, 228 F.2d 853, 860-61 (D.C. Cir.
1961) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963).
31 Kozol, supra note 28, at 116.
32 Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 45 MARQ.
L. REv. 494, 505 (1962).
3 3 HALL, CRIMINAL LAw 500 (2d ed. 1960).
34 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1966).
35 But see, Insanity as a Defense, supra note 15, at 393-94.
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test lies in the fact that even a narrow interpretation will probably
lead to more verdicts of not guilty "by reason of mental impair-
ment" than were obtained under a M'Naghten-irresistible impulse
combination.3" An increase in such verdicts would place a greater
burden upon civil commitment legislation, and the resulting influx
of criminal patients at civil institutions would force the hospital to
adopt containment practices which are contrary to the "open door"
methods used for non-offenders The effect would be detrimental
to psychiatry and could breed complacency in penal reform," while
reinforcing public distrust of both psychiatry and the law.
This last difficulty reaches the crux of the problem involved
in adopting any new test of mental impairment. Any reconstruc-
tion necessarily presupposes that the test is a valid aspect of criminal
law.3" Within traditional criminal law principles, the test operates
to disprove the guilty intent of the accused. Unlike other defenses,
however, its successful use leads to civil incarceration rather than
acquittal. The court, then, is choosing not between guilt and in-
nocence, but only between forms of commitment, effecting, as Judge
Kaufman suggests, a separation of the "truly irresponsible" criminal
from the "irresponsible" one.!' Such a separation is without reason,
of course, if in fact it can be shown that all criminals are "truly
irresponsible." One psychiatrist makes the guarded prediction that,
in a few years, psychiatry will be able to prove the illogic of the
distinction.4 Such a prediction suggests that reform should focus
not on the semantics of the test but rather on basic criminal law
principles.42
RONALD E. HOLTMAN
36See Diamond, sapra note 15.
37Ibid. In some respects our hospitals may in fact be worse than prisons. One
authority states that 80% of our psychiatric institutions are purely custodial and offer
no treatment, even to non-criminal patients. Schmideberg, The Promise of Psychiatry:
Hopes and Disillusionment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 19, 22 (1962).
38 See Diamond, supra note 15, at 193; Schmideberg, supra note 37, at 22.
39 But see Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not?, 72
YALE .J. 853 (1963), in which the authors question the validity of mens rea as a
fundamental concept in criminal law and the related use of a test of criminal respon-
sibility.
40 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966).
41 Diamond, supra note 15, at 198.
42 Diamond, supra note 15, at 201-05. See also Goldstein & Katz, supra note 39,
at 872. Judge Kaufman himself has taken the view that revising the old tests may not
provide an adequate remedy. Insanity as a Defense, supra note 15, at 394-95 (remarks
of Judge Kaufman). However, being limited to just that, the Second Circuit appar-
ently felt that more humane treatment would be given to the accused under the Model
Penal Code test.
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